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190 SIMMONS v. RHODES & JAMIESON, LTD. 
Beach, 29 Cal.2d 848, 851 [179 P.2d 799], the O'Dea case 
considered the pension as vested and not subject to be taken 
away. In the Chaney case the change in the law would ad. 
versely affect the pensioner and the language indicated the 
pensioner could choose the old law or the new law. In the 
Brophy case the statute by its language was prospective and 
construed to apply to those then receiving pensions. We do 
not have language and legislative action equivalent to that 
used here in any of the cited cases. The Jordan and Holm. 
berg cases are out of harmony with the cases hereinabove 
discussed and are disapproved. 
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed 
to enter judgment in accordance with the views herein ex. 
pressed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, J., Traynor, .T., Schauer, J., Spence, 
,J., and McComb, .J., concurred. 
[S. F. No. 19357. In Bank. Feb. 10, 1956.] 
GIPSON E. SIMMONS, Appellant, v. RHODES AND 
JAMIESON, LTD. (a Corporation) et al., Respondents. 
[1] Sales-Warranties-Merchantability.-"Merchantable quality" 
means that the substance sold is reasonably suitable for the 
ordinary uses it was manufactured to meet. 
[2] Id.-Warranties-Merchantability.-Where ready-mixed ce-
ment purchased to lay a concrete basement floor was fit for 
that purpose, this was the only purpose for which the test 
of merchantability could be applied. 
[3] Id.-Warranties-Cement.-A seller of ready-mixed cement 
need not warn the buyer that it will burn the skin, especially 
where the buyer knows that quicklime, which has a caustic 
effect, is one of the necessary ingredients of cement. 
[4] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application of Rule.-In an 
action by a buyer of ready-mixed cement against the seller for 
burns sustained while using the cement, the doctrine of res 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Sales, § 66 et seq.; Am.Jur., Sales, § 341 ct seq. 
[4] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 123 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, 
§ 295 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Sales,§ 131(1); [3] Sales, § 134.5; 
[ 4, 5] Negligence, § 138 ; [ 6] Negligence, § 135; [7] Evidence, § 18; 
[8] Negligence, § 177. 
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wns not: applicable since, in lhe absence of evi~ 
feasible means of discovering the dei'cets or danger 
sold, the seller was not liab]f' for an injury 
from the use of the eommodity. 
[5] Id.~Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application of Rule.- In an action 
a of ready-mixed cement against the seller for burns 
sustained while using the cement, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine 
not npplicahle for the reason that when plaintiff seeks 
on the theory that a eommodity contains a foreign 
~ubstance and admits that he added material to that delivered 
defendant, plaintiff must affirmatively show that the sub-
he added did not cause the injury. 
[6] Id.~Res Ipsa Loquitur-Conduct of Plaintiff as Factor.-
Plaintiff may properly rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
eYcn though he has participated in the events leading to the 
if the evidence excludes his conduct as the responsible 
cause~ 
[7] Evidence-Judicial Notice.-It is a matter of common knowl-
that water activates the lime in cement. 
[8] Negligence-Nonsuit.-In an action by a buyer of ready-mixed 
cmnent against the seller for burns sustained while using the 
eement, where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not appli-
cable and there was no negligence on the part of the seller, 
nonsuit was properly granted. 
"\PPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra 
Costa County. Harold Jacoby, J ndge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for breach of warranty and for negli-
genee. ,J uclgment of nonsuit affirmed. 
I\nssell F. King for Appellant. 
Rode, Burnhill & Moffitt, L. R. \Veinmann, 
John N. James, Hot>y, Hall & Conti, James F. Hoey and 
Viadro for Hrspondents. 
l\lcCOMB, J.-Plaintiff purchased some ready-mixed ce-
ment from defendant Rhodes and Jamieson, Ltd., through 
its employee, defendant Harold Aydelotte. A.fter using the 
mixture for the purpose for which it was intended, plaintiff 
suffered severe burns. He brought this action against the two 
setting forth causes of action for a breach of 
warranty and for negligence. The trial court granted a non-
snit at the close of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff appeals. 
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'l'he facts most favorable to 
Plaintiff, a welder by trade, was constructing his own 
home. after laying the foundations, he met de-
fendant an employee of defendant Rhodes and 
Jamieson. Plaintiff showed M:r. Aydelotte around the prem. 
ises and particularly the area where it was proposed to lay 
the concrete basement floor. The state of construction exist-
ing ~1\.ydelotte inspected the premises made it apparent 
that such slab could only be laid by working inside the base-
ment area. Aydelotte solicited the sale of cement for his 
company, and plaintiff agreed to buy, leaving the type of 
mixture up to the seller. At 10:30 a. m. on November 10, 
1952, the defendant company delivered its first load of mixed 
cement. In order to reach the basement area, the cement was 
poured down a chute through a window opening and into 
the forms. Plaintiff added 10 gallons of water to it and re-
quested that the succeeding loads be wetter. Three loads in 
all were delivered. Because plaintiff had difficulty in spread-
ing the cement he secured the assistance of a neighbor. They 
leveled the cement by pushing it into position, using shovels 
and a long board for this purpose. During this maneuver 
plaintiff frequently got down on his hands and knees to shove 
the leveling board. At this time he was wearing galoshes, 
jeans, a khaki shirt and rubber gloves. Plaintiff testified that 
the galoshes were not worn to protect him from burns but 
to protect his feet from getting wet and to enable him to 
handle the slick shovel. He also testified that he had never 
o;een anyone use rags or padding on his legs to protect 
them from the cement. He had observed that most cement 
workers worked while standing on boards, but believed they 
did this to keep from getting wet and dirty. No one had 
ever warned him of the danger of getting burned by cement, 
although he did know that exposure to wet cement caused a 
drying out of the skin. Prior to the accident he had had some 
experience with laying cement. On none of these occasions, 
although he had handled the cement with his bare hands, had 
he ever been injured by the use of the cement other than a 
roughening of the skin of his hands. 
Plaintiff worked leveling the cement floor from 10 :30 a. m. 
to 3 :15 p. m. During half of this period his knees and legs 
were in contact with the wet cement. Shortly after 1 p. m. 
plaintiff began to notice a ''tingle'' on his legs, which became 
increasingly irritating. He continued to work, however, until 
the job was finished. 'l'hereafter he washed his legs with soap 
L 
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n, rnedieation 
and he was allowr(l to go home. Plaintiff re-
the next for further treatment. 'l'>vo 
's 
It was then dis-
he ·was 15 per cent of the 
, most of the burns being of the third degree 
two extensive skin grafting operations were 
and was hospitalized for nearly two 
doctor testified that plaintiff v;,;as not allergic to 
aml ''in my opinion this was definitely a chemical burn, 
(hlc' r o eon tact with cement." 
breach of warranty was reasonably and properly 
evidence, on both causes of action, at the close of 
a nonsni.t was granted. 
are presented : 
Fms·r 
there was an implied warranty of fitness 
purpose of laying a basement floor including a sec-
warranty that the cement was reasonably safe to 
did the evidencn disclose a breach of warranty? 
17:35 of the Ci dl Code provides in part: ". . . there 
warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness 
particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract 
except as follows: 
.. Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes 
to the seller the particular purpose for which the 
required, and it appears that the buyer relies on 
's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or 
or not), there is an imp 1 ied warranty that 
shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. 
\Vl1ere the goods are bought by description from a 
deals in goods of that description (whether he 
grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied 
that the goods shall be of merchantable quality." 
claims a breach of implied warranty under the pro-
of the foregoing section, his theory being that the 
Cl'ment was not of merchantable quality. 
Xo evidence was introduced to show that this crment con-
46 C.2d-7 
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tained any unusual substance or differed from ordinary 
cement in any way. 
[1] "Merchantable quality" means that the substance sold 
is reasonably suitable for the ordinary uses it was manufac-
tured to meet. ( 27 Words and Phrases ( perm.ed. 1940), 1955 
Pocket Part, p. 26.) 
[2] It is conceded that the cement vms fit for the purpose 
of laying a basement floor. 'fhis is the only purpose for 
which the test of merchantability could be applied under the 
facts of the present case. [3] 'l'here is likewise no merit 
in the proposition that the cement had a concealed or hidden 
danger unknown to plaintiff and that defendant should have 
warned him that it would burn the skin. The injury occurred 
in the handling of a standard and common commodity. 
Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630 [7 S.Ct. 696, 30 L.Ed. 
810], relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable to the facts 
in this case. In the cited case defendant sold rags to the 
plaintiff for the purpose of manufacturing paper. The rags 
were infected vvith smallpox and, although they were made 
into satisfactory paper, several of plaintiff's employees died 
of smallpox in the process. There the court properly held 
there was a breach of warranty of fitness because rags are 
not normally infected with smallpox. In the present case, 
quicklime, which has a caustic effect, is one of the necessary 
ingredients of cement, and it is unquestioned that plaintiff 
was familiar with this fact. 
SECOND 
vV as there a showing of negligence upon the part of de-
fendants? 
No. 
[ 4] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not here ap-
plicable because in the absence, as in the present case, of 
evidence of feasible means of discovering the defects or 
danger in the commodity sold, the seller is not liable for 
an injury resulting from the use of the commodity. (Honea 
v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614, 618 [3] et seq. [140 P.2d 
369].) 
The only evidence of any testing was that defendant Rhodes 
and Jamieson, Ltd., had its product tested for proper propor-
tions of materials to be used for various types of construction. 
[5] In addition, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not 
here applicable for the reason that when a plaintiff seeks 
recovery upon the theory that a commodity contains a foreign 
substance and admits that he added material to that delivered 
l 
SnnroNs v. HnonEs & LTD. ]!):) 
r 46 c.2ct 190; 293 P.2d 26J 
plaintiff must show that the 
substance he added did not cause the injury. v. Coca 
Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 444 [247 P.2d 344] .) 
Plaintiff may properly rely upon the doctrine of res 
even thongh he has participated in the events 
to the accident if the evidence exeludes his conduct 
cause. v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
the ease at bar, plaintiff did not offer any evidence to 
show that the water which he had added to the cement ball 
no effeet. 
[7] It is a matter of common knowledge that >rater acti-
n<tes the lime in cement. (See Dalton v. Pioneer Sand &; 
Co., 37 Wn.2d 946 [227 P.2d 173, 174 et srq.]; also 
"llmr." \Yebstrr's Krw Internat. Diet. (2d eel. 1950), p. 
1±33; G Bncy. Britannica (1951 eel.), p. 207.) A street su-
perintendent testified that lime does not give off heat until it 
becomes wet. Obviously, thinning the solution would allow 
it to soak through the plaintiff's clothes more quickly. 
Therefore, it is clear that when plaintiff added water 
to the cement, additional heat was created and the thinning 
of the cement caused the quicklime to be more readily ab-
sorbed by his clothing, which in turn resulted in his being 
burned. 
Our eonclnsiou is fully in accord with t\yo recent decisions 
of this court. In LaPm·tc v. Houston, ml Cal.2d 167 at 170 
P.2d 665], Mr. Chief ,Justice Gibson, speaking for the 
court said: "It ·was at least equally probable that the acci-
dent was caused by some fault in the mechanism of the car 
for which defendants were not liable as that it resulted from 
any negligent act or omission of the mechanic. Accordingly, 
it ,·annot be said that it is more likely than not that tbe 
aceidfmt \Vas caused by the negligence of defendants, and 
h<'llt:e the case was not a proper one for the application of 
the rloetrine of res ipsa loquitur." In Burr Y. Sherwin Wil-
liams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682 at 691 [268 P.2d 10411, the Chief 
Ju,;t speaking for a unanimous court, said: ''The in-
strnet ions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they 
to state all the conditions under which res ipsa 
would be applieable, they did not inform the jury 
that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality 1vhich cansect 
thfo damage wm; not mishandled or its condition otherwise 
after control was relinqwishcd by the person against 
whom the doctrine is to be applied." (Italics added.) 
196 SIMMONS 1J. RHODES & JAMIESON, LTD. [46 0.2d 
[8] Since the doctrine of res loquitur is not applicable 
under the facts of the instant case and there is a total absence 
of any negligence upon the part of defendants, the non-
suit was properly granted upon the second alleged cause of 
action. 
The is affirmed. 
and 
concurred. 
J.-I dissent. 
I disagree with the majority on both the of im-
plied warranty and breach thereof and res ipsa loquitur. 
'l'he majority opinion omits important facts and states, con-
trary to the record, that there is no evidence on crucial 
points. 
As appears more fully from the opinion of Mr. Presiding 
Justice Peters, hereinafter set forth, in speaking for the 
District Court of Appeal in this case, that there is evidence 
that the implied warranty of merchantability was breached 
because there is evidence that the cement caused the severe 
burns suffered by plaintiff and that such burns are not to be 
expected from the use of properly mixed concrete. Plaintiff 
did not know of the danger and defendant, producer of the 
material, must be presumed to know the character of its 
product. 
On the issue of res ipsa loquitur, and the inference of 
negligence arising therefrom, the same above mentioned evi-
dence is present. It is not important that defendant's tests 
did not reveal the dangerous character of the concrete. The 
evidence shows that ordinarily concrete does not cause burns. 
It follows that as this concrete, over which defendant exer-
cised control, did cause burns, there is an inference of 
defendant's negligence. 
As above stated I adopt the opinion of Mr. Presiding 
Justice Peters as follows : 
"Plaintiff, Gipson Simmons, purchased some ready-mixed 
cement from defendant Rhodes and Jamieson, Ltd., through 
its employee, defendant Harold Aydelotte. After using the 
mixture for the purpose for which it was intended plaintiff 
suffered severe burns. He brought this action against the 
two defendants, setting forth causes of action for a breach 
of warranty and for negligence. The trial court granted a 
nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff appeals. 
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concrete basement floor, an area 
state of construction existing when Ayde-
the made it apparent that snch 
be by working inside the basement area. 
sale of cement for his company, and 
to buy, leaving the type of mixture up to the 
At 10 :30 a. m. of November 10, 1952, the defendant 
company delivered its first load of mixed cement. In order 
basement area the cement was poured down a 
vlliVU~ll a window opening and into the forms. Because 
mixture was not wet enough, the plaintiff added 10 gallons 
water to it and requested that the succeeding loads be 
loads in all were delivered. Because plaintiff 
uuuvLl.L".r in spreading the cement he secured the assistance 
They leveled the cement by pushing it into 
shovels and a long board for this purpose. 
this maneuver plaintiff frequently got down on his 
and knees to shove the leveling board. At this time 
wearing galoshes, jeans, a khaki shirt and rubber 
Plaintiff testified that the galoshes and gloves were 
worn to him from burns, but to protect his feet 
,.,t<r1n,ry wet and to enable him to handle the slick shoveL 
also testified that he had never seen anyone use 
padding on <his legs to protect them from the 
He had observed that most cement workers worked 
o~a,uu•LLE. on boards, but they did this to keep 
!<,I;;!,LUJL~ wet and dirty. No one had ever warned him 
u"''"'"'".~. of getting burned by cement, although he did 
that exposure to wet cement caused a drying out of 
skin. 
l::'la,mtatr, prior to the accident, had had some experience 
cement. He had helped to build some cement water 
had helped two neighbors pour cement foundations 
and had occasionally poured cement while work-
construction crews. On none of these occasions, 
he had handled the cement barehanded, had he 
been injured by the use of the cement other than a rough-
of the skin of his hands. 
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"Plaintiff worked leveling the cement floor from 10:30 
a. m. to 3 :15 p. m. During half of this period his knees 
and legs were in contact with the wet cement. His neighbor 
assistant did not come in direct contact with the wet cement 
to the same extent as did plaintiff. Shortly after 1 p. m. 
plaintiff began to notice a 'tingle' on his legs which became 
increasingly irritating. He continued to work, however, be-
cause of the necessity of leyeling the floor before the cement 
set. Upon finishing the job he washed his legs with soap and 
~water, observed that his legs 'looked green,' changed his 
clothes and got a neighbor to drive him to the hospital. There 
he was bathed again, medication placed on his legs, penicillin 
administered, and his attending doctor, because there were no 
beds available in the hospital, allowed him to go home. Plain-
tiff returned to the hospital the next day for further treatment, 
and the doctor visited him at home. Two days after the 
exposure to the cement plaintiff's temperature reached 103 
degrees and the doctor had him hospitalized. It was then 
discovered that plaintiff was severely burned over 15 per 
cent of the area of his body, most of the burns being of the 
third degree type. This means that for the most part the 
burn extended through the entire thickness of the skin, that 
is, through both the epidermis and corium and down to the 
subcutaneous fatty tissue. This required two extensive skin 
grafting operations, the first, with three doctors, requiring 
8 hours, and the second 5% hours. Plaintiff was hospitalized 
for nearly two months. rrhe doctor testified that plaintiff 
was not allergic to cement, and that 'in my opinion this was 
definitely a chemical burn, due to contact with cement.' 
Although defendant claims that this answer was stricken, no 
order striking it was made. At any rate, the fact that the 
burns ·were caused by contact with the cement is at least a 
reasonable, if not inevitable, inference. 
''The street superintendent of Richmond, after qualifying 
as an expert in concrete construction, testified that during 
his 25 years of experience he had seen men many times work 
for three or four hour periods in cement doing hand troweling 
without the protection of boards or padding, and during 
that entire time he had never seen a man burned to the extent 
of requiring medical care, having observed, at most, a few 
pimples or chapping caused by the exposure to the cement. 
'l'he attending physician testified that prior to treating plain-
tiff he had observed but one prior burn caused by exposure 
to concrete, and that was a small burn. He also testified 
Sn.nviONS v. RHODES & JAJ\HESON, LTD. 199 
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that there was very little medical literature on the subject 
of cement burns, he having seen only one article on the subject. 
Tn that artide no case was reported so severe as to rrquire 
skin grafting. 
drrmatologist, vvho had examined and treated plaintiff, 
that he had never seen or hrard or rrad of a concret(' 
burn as extensive or as that suffered plaintiff, and 
that the burn suffered by plaintiff IYas a chemical burn which, 
in his opinion, based on the history of the ease, vYas due to 
the ecment or some snbstanee in it. 'l'he burn was not caused 
bY an allergy towards cement. This had been determined 
· eertain allergy tests of various kinds of cement, including 
one test made from the very slab here involved. 
"Notice of breach of warranty was reasonably and properly 
"On this evidence, on both causes of action, at the close 
of plaintiff's case, a nonsuit was granted. 
"Propriety of Nonsuit on Warranty Cause of Action 
'' Seetion 1735 of the Civil Code provides : 
" ' ... there is no implied warranty or condition as to 
the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods 
under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follo·ws: 
"' (1) ·where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes 
known to the seller the particular purpose for whieh the 
are reqnired, and it appears that the buyer relies on the 
seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manu-
faeturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods 
shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. 
" '(2) ·where the goods are bought by description from 
the seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he 
lw the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied 
that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.' 
"Clearly, it was proper to grant the nonsuit as to defendant 
as to this cause of action. Obviously, he was the 
agent of Rhodes and Jamieson, and was not himself the seller 
\Yiihin the meaning of the section. 
''As to defendant Rhodes and Jamieson it appears that for 
the pnrposes of a nonsuit, all the elements required by the 
section can be found in the evidence or in reasonable 
inferences therefrom. There can be no reasonable doubt 
that plaintiff made known to the agent of the seller the par-
ti<•ular pnrpose for whieh the goods were required. It is also 
a reasonable inference that plaintiff relied on the seller's skill 
and judgment to pick the proper type and mixture of cement 
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for the There is no dispute that the cement furnished 
made a cement floor. If it be assumed that the warranty 
here involved includes a warranty that the cement was safe 
to handle, a later discussed, then it seems clear that 
it is a reasonable inference from the evidence that plaintiff 
relied on the seller's skill and as to the cement 
safe to handle. to the seller's had 
no means of the and could not be reasonably 
expected to do so. The evidence shows that the seller used 
the service of a laboratory. Thus, it can reasonably 
be inferred that plaintiff relied upon the seller's superior 
knowledge as to the safety in handling the cement. 
''The only debatable question is whether the implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose includes not only 
the primary warranty that the cement was fit for the purpose 
of a cement floor, but also a secondary warranty that the 
cement was reasonably safe to han9-le in constructing the 
floor. On this subject there is a difference of opinion. There 
is at least one out-of-state authority directly in support of 
the seller's contention that the implied warranty here involved 
does not include a warranty of reasonable safety in handling. 
The case is Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wn.2d 
946 [227 P.2d 173]. There, as here, ready-mixed cement was 
purchased to construct a cement floor and the purchaser, while 
laying the floor, received severe burns from coming into 
contact with the cement. There, as here, the purchaser relied 
upon a breach of the implied warranty. A motion for dis-
missal was granted at the close of plaintiff's case. This was 
affirmed. The opinion on the point in question is quite short, 
contains no analysis of the nature of the warranty, and cites 
no cases in support of its conclusions. The court first pointed 
out (p. 174) that: 'No evidence was introduced to show that 
this cement contained any unusual substance, or differed 
from ordinary cement in any way.'* The court then disposed 
of the point in the following cursory manner: ' "Merchant-
able quality" means that the substance sold is reasonably 
suitable for the ordinary uses it was manufactured to meet. 
27 'N ords and Phrases, Perm. Eel., Pocket Part. No conten-
tion is made by the appellant that the cement was not satis-
factory for the purpose of laying a basement floor. This 
is the only purpose for which the test of merchantability 
*"In this respect the Washington case differs from our case. In our 
case there is evidence from which it can be inferred that exposure to 
cement normally does not cause severe burns to the user. 
HHODES & 
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810 J, the seller sold the 
manufacture of paper. The 
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are not 
with the 
was a 
of the 
several 
article's use. 
S.Ot. 696, 
to be used in 
rags were infected with 
became infected. The 
product-the paper-was not dangerous 
the manufacturing proeess killed the germs. But 
m•yerthE'less the court held that there vvas a breaeh of the 
of fitness for a particular purpose. After setting 
the facts, the court stated 646) : ''fhis was of itself 
infected rags] sufficient evidence to be submitted 
of a warranty and a breach of it. A "Warranty, 
or implied, that rags sold are fit to be manufactured 
paper, is broken, not only if they will not make good 
papee, but equally if they cannot be made into paper at all, 
1Yithout killing or sickening those m the manu-
'Plaintiff' also cites a series of clothing and cases 
are not directly in point. In all of them clothing or 
cosmetics caused injury to the wearer or user. In all of them 
court found a breach of the implied "Warranty. In such 
ca-;es the purpose for which the clothing or cosmetics were 
was to wear or use them. Obviously, if could not 
worn or used safely they >vere not fit for the purpose 
which they were sold. 'l'hus, the cases are not directly 
In one of them, however-the case of F'lynn v. 
Co., 242 lVIass. 450 [136 N.E. 27 A.L.R. 1504]-
appears the following pertinent language 253) : 
" 'It well may be that the scope of an implied warranty 
of fitness does not extend to :fitness in of matters 
unknown to the dealer and peculiar to the individual 
A seller of food presumably does not warrant that 
the particular kind of food which the buyer calls for will 
suited to his peculiar idiosyncracies .... But it appears 
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that the particular ''defect'' which injured the plaintiff would 
have similarly injured any normal person .... 
'' 'The scope of the statutory implied warranty cannot 
be limited so as to exclude a warranty against the latent 
presence of foreign substances which are injurious in the 
course of the normal use of the garment for the purpose 
intended.' 
''Although the exploding bottle case of Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453 [150 P.2d 436], is not directly 
in point, in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor, 
at page 464, there appears some language that is helpful. It 
is as follows: 'The retailer, even though not equipped to test 
a product, is under an absolute liability to his customer, for 
the implied warranties of fitness for proposed use and mer-
chantable quality include a warranty of safety of the product.' 
''On principle it would be unreasonable and unjust to 
hold that the warranty is limited to the safety of the end 
product and does not include a warranty that the goods fur-
nished can be safely used in the construction of the end 
product. For that reason we are impressed with the reason-
ing of the United States Supreme Court in the Dushane case 
and are not impressed with the reasoning of the Washington 
court in the Dalton ease. We, therefore, hold that for 
purposes of nonsuit there was an implied warranty that 
the cement was reasonably safe for the purpose of laying a 
concrete floor. 
"The next question is whether there was any evidence of 
a breach of this warranty. In this connection, it must be 
kept in mind that as to this warranty the seller is not an 
insurer that the goods can be used with absolute safety or 
that they are perfectly adapted to the intended use. Section 
1735 of the Civil Code merely requires that the goods be 
'reasonably fit' for the intended use. (See also Tremerolri v. 
Austin Trailm· Equip. Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 464 [227 P.2d 
923]; JJlix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674 [59 P.2d 
144] .) 
''On this question of breach, it is a matter of common 
knowledge, and was known to plaintiff, that cement contains 
lime. Plaintiff knew that lime is a caustic, and that exposure 
to it irritated the skin. Plaintiff also knew that cement 
workers customarily wore boots and worked from boards, 
although he testified that he thought that the purpose of 
this was to keep from getting dirty, not to keep from getting 
burned. 
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the other hand, there is direct evidence that these 
were of unusual severity, and it can be inferred that 
burns do not normally oecur upon exposure to wet cement. 
'rhe street superintendent testified that he had seen men 
unprotected in wet cement for long periods and never 
seen anyone burned, although he had observed some chap-
and some pimples. Both doctors testified that they had 
nev•:r seen, heard or read of a case of cement burn severe 
to require skin grafting. Plaintiff was not peculiarly 
allergic to cement. 'l'he evidence shows that it was reason-
necessary, in laying the floor, at least by an amateur, 
for plaintiff to expose himself to the cement, and that de-
fendant knew the conditions under which the cement was 
to be used. 
''For the purposes of a nonsuit, there can be no doubt 
that the evidence shO\YS that the cement caused the burn. 
The two doctors so testified, and the hospital record indicated 
a eement burn. The irritation started two hours after ex-
posnre to the wet cement, and there is no evidence that 
plaintiff came into contact with any other substance that 
conld have caused the burn. 
'' 'J'hus, for the purposes of defeating a nonsuit, there was 
ample evidence of a breach of the warranty of fitness. 
"It was, therefore, error to grant a nonsuit on the implied 
cause of action. 
"\Ve now turn to the negligence cause of action. There 
is 110 evidence that defendant Aydelotte was negligent or had 
any control OYer the cement mixture. The nonsuit was proper 
as to him on this cause of action. 
"As to defendant Rhodes and Jamieson, Ltd., whether 
the nonsuit was properly granted depends upon 11hether the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to the facts. There 
has been a great deal written as to the scope of this doctrine 
ill recent years, mueh of it by the California courts. It is 
not necessary to review those many cases in this opinion. 
It i,., now settl0d that the doctrine applies (1) if it can be 
reasonably concluded from a basis of experience, either com-
mon to the community, or brought out in the evidence, that 
Ow acei<lent is of a kind that dol's not normally occur unless 
SOJJl(:one "IYas m~gligcnt; (2) and, if it \Yas caused by an 
instrumentality in the exclusive control of the defendant; 
c:n and, if it was not eontributed to by a voluntar~· aetion 
on the part of the plaintiff. (See generally Ybarra v. Span-
25 Cal.2cl 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R 1258] ; Escola 
204 [46 C.2d 
As was said 
43 Cal.2d 287, 292 [ 272 
is met 'where it appears that 
such a nature that it can be said, in the 
that probably was the result of 
someone and that the defendant is probably 
the person who is also, in addition to the 
authorities snpra, LaPorte v. Hanston, 33 Cal.2d 167 
[199 P.2d ; Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitttr in Cal'ifornia, 
87 Cal.L.Rev. at p. 195.) 
"It is elear for the pmpose of getting by a 
nonsuit, the third requirement-reasonableness of use by the 
here shown. The plaintiff, of course, assumed 
the normal risks of the ordinary effects of exposure to wet 
of the skin and a rash-but there is no 
evidence or no inference from the evidence that as a reason-
able man he or should have known, that there was a 
third burns. In fact, the inference is quite 
The defendant knew that the cement had to 
from the and knew, or should have 
knowu, that exposure to the wet cement was reasonably 
possible. 'fhe method used to spread the cement was reason-
able under the circumstances. 
''On this from a judgment of nonsuit we are, of 
course, not concerned ·with contributory negligence. That is 
an affirmative and can only be involved if the evi-
dence shows, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was contribu-
tively negligent. No such showing was here made. 
''The debatable issue is whether the defendant had 
'exclusive control' of the instrumentality causing the injury. 
In this connection thr courts have held that the fact the 
accident occurred sonwt1me after the defendant relinquished 
eontrol of the causing the injury does not, 
pe1· se, the application of the doctrine, nor does the 
fact that the defendant may not be iu a better position than 
plaintiff to explain the accident preclude its application if 
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" or "con-
the agency or which caused the 
l It has been stated that the purpose 
requirement is to eliminate the that the 
was caused by someone other than the defendant. 
authorities.] Accordingly, its use merely to aid 
in determining whether, under the rule, it 
probable than not that the \Yas the result of 
the negligence. 
" 'The requirement of control is not an absolute one>. 
as we have seen, the doctrine '.Vill not ordinarily 
if it is c>qually probable that the negligence was that 
of someone other than the the need not 
all other persons who have been re-
where the defendant's appears to be 
probable explanation of the accident. [Citing 
Further, it is settled that the fact that the 
occurs some time after the defendant relinquishes 
of the instrumentality which causes the accident 
(loes preclude application of the doctrine there 
is eddence that the instrumentality had not been improperly 
the plaintiff or some third persons, or its condition 
changed, after control vvas relinquished by the 
[Citing cases.] Of course, it must appear that 
the defendant had sufficient control or connection with the 
that it can be said that he was more probably than 
person responsible for plaintiff's 
. As recently held by the Court of Oregon 
well reasoned opinion, a plaintiff may properly rely 
res ipsa loquitur even though he has participated in 
eyents leading to the accident if the evidence excludes his 
(:onduct as the responsible cause. ( Gow v. JJiultnomah Hotel, 
191 Ore. 45 [224 P.2d 552, 555-560, 228 P.2d 791].)' 
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''The court also discussed what place the question of the 
defendant's superior knowledge of the cause of the accident 
has in the application of the doctrine, in the following lan-
guage (p. 445): 
'' 'Another factor which some of the cases have considered 
in applying the doctrine is that the defendant may have 
superior knowledge of what occurred and that the chief evi-
dence of the cause of the accident may be accessible to the 
defendant but inaccessible to the plaintiff. [Citing authori-
ties.] It seems clear, however, that the doctrine may be 
applied even though the defendant is not in a better position 
than plaintiff to explain what occurred if it appears more 
probable than not that the injury resulted from negligence 
on the part of defendant. [Citing authorities.] ' 
''The court then went on to hold that there was a duty 
on the part of the bottling company to inspect and test the 
bottles for defects, and that the fact the bottles were furnished 
by another did not preclude application of the doctrine. 
''The problem involved in the instant case is that the cement 
used by defendant in its mixture was furnished by the Ideal 
Cement Company. Ideal is not a party to this action. We 
have no way of knowing, nor has the plaintiff, whether the 
overly dangerous qualities of the mixture were the result of 
the defendant's actions, or whether it was caused solely by 
the cement furnished by Ideal. Either possibility is reason-
able. But even if it be assumed that it is more reasonable 
that the burns were caused by the cement and not by anything 
the defendant added, this would not preclude the application 
of the doctrine as to defendant. vVhen the defendant uses 
a material in a mixture that it sells, such defendant is under 
a duty to inspect reasonably that material to determine 
whether the material incorporated in its product is defective. 
This is certainly so where, as here, the defendant knows, 
or should know, that the plaintiff has no means of testing 
the product. Although the doctrine is not applicable where 
it is at least equally probable that the accident was caused 
by another (LaPorte v. Houston, 33 Cal.2d 167 [199 P.2d 
665]), this rule is not applicable where the defendant is 
under a duty to inspect. This was the precise holding in 
the Escola and Zentz cases, cited supra. Although it appears 
that defendant used the services of a testing firm, the nature 
and scope of such service, or its reasonableness, do not appear 
in the evidence. The reasonableness of such inspection, if 
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any, of course, a matter of defense, and here the nonsuit 
was granted at the close of plaintiff's case. 
''There was evidence that plaintiff added water to the 
after he received possession, but there was no evidence 
this in any way was unreasonable or contributed to the 
Whether plaintiff handled the product reasonably 
possession is a question of fact for the jury. 
•~n,..n.n"' v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Ca1.2d.514 (203 P.2d 522] .) 
mere fact that water was added does not make the doctrine 
inapplicable as a matter of law. In the Zentz ease the plain-
put ice around the coke bottle. This was held not to 
preclude the application of the doctrine. The two situations 
are comparable. 
"For the foregoing reasons we conclude that on the negli-
eause of action the plaintiff, with the aid of the doctrine 
res ipsa loquitur, made out a case sufficient to put the 
on defendant to show that it acted as a reasonable 
prudent person would act under the circumstances. 
''Thus, on both causes of action, it was error to grant the 
''The judgment is affirmed as to defendant Aydelotte; it 
is reversed as to defendant Rhodes and Jamieson, Ltd. Plain-
to recover costs from defendant Rhodes and Jamieson, 
" 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 8, 
Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
